

Political Dynamics in the Determination of Regional Budget Amendments in Samosir Regency, Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Samosir Regency amended the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget for the 2022 fiscal year. This change was made because there was a budget that was considered not on target. This research seeks to see the political dynamics in the P-APBD process in Samosir Regency. The research method used in this research is a descriptive qualitative research method using data collection techniques through interviews and observations. Data analysis techniques through data reduction, data presentation and conclusion drawing. The results showed that in the process of determining the P-APBD of Samosir Regency, there was a phenomenon where the P-APBD could not be implemented or was not parliamentary because of the lack of communication between the Samosir Regency Regional Government as the executive and the Samosir Regency DPRD as the legislature. This is because several party factions with seats in the Samosir Regency DPRD did not attend the plenary meeting, especially the PDI-P faction, which is the dominant faction and opposition to the government. This was motivated by their disagreement with several programs that were discussed in the P-APBD, namely the honorarium policy of the Regent's Team for the Acceleration of Development and the budget for renting a hotel room designated as the official residence of the Samosir regent, which was considered to be quite costly.

INTRODUCTION

Budgeting, especially the expenditure and income budgets of villages, regions, and the state, is one situation that requires a political process. The Government's main tool to articulate the declaration of overall state priorities is the budget (Febrina, 2016). More complexly, the Regional Government uses the Regional Budget to develop its own region by regional needs and the vision and mission of the region. Budget Politics is regulated in the 1945 Constitution Article 23, which reads, (1) The state revenue and expenditure budget as a form of state financial management is determined annually by law and implemented openly and responsibly for the greatest prosperity of the people. (2) The President shall submit the draft law on the state revenue and expenditure budget for discussion with the House of Representatives by considering the considerations of the Regional Representatives Council. (3) If the House of Representatives does not approve the draft State Budget proposed by the President, the Government shall implement the previous year's State Budget.

Thanks to the implementation of regional autonomy in Indonesia, local governments have the authority to manage their regions, especially budgets. The implementation of regional autonomy is supported by the existence of the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD). The APBD is a political document resulting from a compromise between the legislature and the executive. The APBD, according to Rozidateno, is a form of executive dedication to legislative power that determines priorities and financial needs. Budgets are political documents demonstrating executive commitment and legislative approval in the public sector to use public money for specific purposes (Hanida, 2016). In general, APBD is often interpreted as regional financing. All Regional rights and obligations in the context of implementing Regional Government that can be valued in money, including all types of assets related to Regional Rights and Obligations, are stipulated by Government Regulation Number 58 of 2005 concerning regional financial management.

On the other hand, changes to the APBD, called P-APBD or Amendments to the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget, are required for the regional revenue and expenditure budget. These adjustments are usually caused by developments outside the General Budget Policy (KUA), including those that exceed or do not achieve regional revenue predictions, regional expenditure allocations, and sources and uses of expenditure previously outlined in the KUA. The District Government, which functions as the executive, and the District People's Representative Council (DPRD), the legislature, must work together in this process. The role of political parties in local Government is very important (Regif et al., 2024). Parties that win seats in the Samosir Regency DPRD have the responsibility to represent the aspirations and interests of the community and to supervise the running of the local Government. Through their positions in the DPRD, these parties play a role in the process of policy

discussions, budgeting, and strategic decision-making for the progress of the Samosir Regency. Opposition parties, such as PDIP, are important in criticizing local government policies, voicing alternative views, and ensuring government accountability. On the other hand, other parties, such as PKB, Gerindra, Golkar, NasDem, PAN, and Demokrat, tend to be pro-local Government and are responsible for supporting government policies, encouraging the implementation of planned programs, and ensuring stability in the running of local Government.

Regarding P-APBD, Samosir Regency is one of the regions that will amend the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (P-APBD) for Fiscal Year 2022. This change was made because some of the targeted budgets were off target, plus the previous budget still prioritized COVID-19 prevention. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare and determine the P-APBN again, which involves cooperation between the executive and legislative institutions in the Samosir Regency government. In the Determination of Amendments to the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (P-APBD) of Samosir Regency, there is a phenomenon where the P-APBD cannot be implemented or not parliamentary due to a lack of communication between the Samosir Regency Regional Government as the executive and the Samosir Regency DPRD Members as the legislature. This happened because one of the factions occupying the Samosir Regency DPRD seat did not attend the plenary meeting. The faction in question is the PDI-P faction. This was due to the PDI-P's view that criticized the decision on the content of the P-APBD, which was considered not pro-people. This research examines the dynamics and political process in the determination of the Samosir Regency Regional Budget Amendment for Fiscal Year 2022 with the conclusion that the PDI-P faction is the dominant and opposition faction in the Samosir Regency DPRD, which has a major influence on policies formulated by both the local Government and the Samosir Regency DPRD.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to David Easton's political system theory, policies are created due to the conversion of inputs, such as demand and support, into outputs, or decisions or actions, which are then handled systematically by the political system (Maksudi, 2016). The resulting output takes the form of a policy, which, depending on the inputs developed earlier, can be approved or disapproved by the environment. The interference of existing internal political processes is inseparable from the produced outputs. The political system consists of many political institutions and activities that transform demands, support, and resources into decisions or policies that are authoritative (legal and binding) for all members of society (Christoper et al., 2024). From this explanation, it can be concluded that the political system is all the activities of the political community to make a policy

Policy change is driven by the political actors' preferences, who seek to implement their policy interests and are expected to trigger policy change when they face a policy status quo contrary to their ideological position. Therefore, Tsebelis's (2011) veto player theory assumes that political actors dancing on policy seek to change the policy status quo and consider the political institutional context that constrains them from doing so. Tsebelis (2011) combines the importance of political actors' policy preferences with the institutional constraints they face in a concise theory, which explains policy stability across different types of political regimes. (Ganghof, S, 2003). This concept explains how the existence and distribution of veto power can affect political dynamics in an institutional system.

According to Wildavsky Caiden (2012), budget politics is all about the capacity of state actors to ensure people's welfare through budgeting procedures that include many actors. As a result, budgets become a political battleground. According to Wildavsky and Caiden, budget politics can be seen as a political process where competition for public resources among the various interests of political actors and other interest groups influence political budget decisions. From these two definitions, it is clear that the interaction of political players, each motivated by different interests, determines state budget policies.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on political dynamics in the determination of local budget changes is vast and covers various aspects of the relationship between politics and budgetary decisions. The political budget cycle, which examines how elections affect government fiscal policy, is a widely studied topic in political economy and political science (Aaskoven & Lassen, 2017). Furthermore, previous research has also focused on the political institutional determinants of government budget deficits (Alesina & Perotti, 1995). In addition, a growing body of literature addresses participatory budgeting and its impact on budget dynamics in the public sector (Azevedo et al., 2022). Furthermore, the successful formulation and implementation of fiscal policy is strongly linked to the strength of the fiscal system (Ostermann, 1992).

A critical study of budget participation in Indonesia aims to analyze the practices of budget battles between local governments (executives) and DPRD's (Faisal et al., 2024). Another study empirically tested whether the commitment of the local head and the supervisory function of the DPRD affect the performance of local government expenditure policies, indicating a close relationship between the commitment of the local head and local government expenditure policies (Yatun et al., 2021). In addition, an article investigates the challenges facing decentralized governance in poor and underdeveloped regions in Eastern Indonesia (Shoesmith et al., 2020; Wisesa et al., 2023).

METHODOLOGY

This research uses a qualitative research method with a descriptive type, as this research focuses on the political dynamics and political processes that occur during the determination of the Amendment to the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (P-APBD) of Samosir Regency for the 2022 Fiscal Year. The research was conducted over 6 months, from June 2023 until December 2023. The data collection techniques were carried out through interviews, observation and documentation and analyzed based on the findings produced, which were compared with other supporting data such as secondary data, interpreted and then conclusions were drawn (Aveling et al., 2015). Informants in conducting this research involved the Deputy Chairman of the Samosir Regency DPRD and several PDIP Party factions, as many as 3 people.

RESULTS & DISCUSSION

Political Dynamics in the Determination of the A-PBD of Samosir Regency for Fiscal Year 2022

In determining the Samosir Regency Regional Budget (APBD), input is an essential stage in gathering information and input that will influence the final decision. Several inputs shape changes to the APBD, such as listening to proposals from Samosir Regency's Regional Apparatus Organisations (OPDs) and political lobbying by PDI-P faction DPRD members to the Local Government. Firstly, as part of the input-gathering process, the Samosir District Local Government will systematically listen to proposals and recommendations from the Samosir District OPDs. OPDs, such as relevant agencies and institutions in Samosir District, will submit proposed programs, projects, and budgetary needs that they consider important and relevant to achieving regional development goals. This input provides information on the specific needs in each sector in the Samosir Regency. It provides a complete picture of the priorities that should be considered in the APBD amendment. In addition, DPRD members from the PDI-P faction also provided input through political lobbying. Members of the Samosir Regency DPRD from the PDI-P faction will interact and negotiate with the local government to influence decisions about changes to the Samosir Regency APBD.

In this case, PDI-P faction DPRD members voice their aspirations and political interests in the Samosir Regency and provide arguments and recommendations regarding budget allocations that are important for the regions and communities they are fighting for. Proposals from Samosir District's OPDs and political lobbying by PDI-P legislators constitute a variety of inputs into the process of amending Samosir District's APBD. These inputs include technical aspects and political interests that need to be considered by the Samosir District Government in preparing the draft APBD amendment. Through this input stage, the Samosir District Government can gain a more comprehensive

understanding of the needs and aspirations of sectors in the Samosir District area and consider political interests related to members of the Samosir District DPRD. Through interviews conducted with the PDIP party faction, several political lobbies were conducted, among others, to provide further objections regarding the P-APBD plan, including:

1. The political lobby of the PDI-P faction asked the Samosir Regency's local government to reconsider the Regent Team honorarium policy for the Acceleration of Development (TBPP) of Rp.17,000,000 by applicable laws. In this political lobby, the PDI-P faction conveyed arguments and recommendations so that the TBPP honorarium was based on applicable legal provisions. This aims to ensure that the policy is based on regulations governing salaries and allowances for officials in the Samosir Regency.
2. The PDI-P faction's political lobby asked the Regional Government to adjust the policy of renting the Vantas hotel as an official residence, which costs Rp 40,000,000 monthly. Through this political lobby, the PDI-P faction proposed that the Regional Government consider other more efficient and economical options for this official residence to optimize the use of the Samosir Regency APBD budget.

Unfortunately, the policy on the honorarium of the Samosir Regency TBPP was still included in the APBD amendment. After going through a process of discussion and consideration, the Samosir Regency Regional Government decided to maintain this policy. The policy relates to the budget allocation for the Bupati Team for the Acceleration of Development (TBPP) in implementing development acceleration programs in the Samosir Regency. This output reflects the local government's decision to continue allocating the necessary funds for the sustainability and development of the Samosir Regency TBPP. Furthermore, the policy on leasing the official residence of the Samosir Regent was also included in the APBD amendment. After considering the availability of alternatives and efficiency, the Samosir District Government decided to maintain the policy. This output reflects the local government's decision to continue leasing official houses with certain costs in the Samosir Regency APBD.

Due to these policies, the PDI-P faction of Samosir Regency chose not to attend the plenary meeting to determine the P-APBD of Samosir Regency. The absence of 8 members of the PDI-P faction of Samosir Regency resulted in the plenary meeting not fulfilling the quorum because the requirement to fulfill the quorum is that at least 17 members of the DPRD are present so that an agreement and ratification of the P-APBD of Samosir Regency cannot be reached. This shows that the PDI-P faction of Samosir District is expressing rejection or protest against the TBPP honorarium

policies and leasing the Samosir Regent's official residence. With the absence of the Samosir PDI-P faction, determining the P-APBD of the Samosir Regency could not continue and failed. The decision of the PDI-P faction of the Samosir Regency affected the quorum of the plenary meeting and had an impact on not reaching an agreement and ratification of the Samosir Regency P-APBD.

"During the meetings before the plenary meeting, the PDI-P faction was still present in the meeting so that the meeting ran and fulfilled the quorum, because the meeting was still a process of collecting opinions, the deadlock point was during the discussion meeting, the PDI-P faction began to show its attitude by walking out."

"Since the discussion of the R-APBD in 2022, the PDI-P faction has rejected and taken a walk out attitude at the time of voting for joint decision making on the determination of the Samosir APBD Regional Regulation in 2022."

The political dynamics in the P-APBD process were based on the request of the PDIP faction, which the Samosir district government should have considered. However, there was an internal political conflict between the Samosir Regency local government and the PDI-P faction before the election and an emotional feeling of dissatisfaction from the PDI-P faction because their incumbent candidate lost the election contest by the statement of Deputy Chairperson II of the Samosir Regency DPRD during the interview. Some of these things eventually became triggers and factors for changes in the political dynamics and interactions between the local government and the PDI-P faction of Samosir Regency, including shifts in political attitudes, changes in strategy, protests, and rejection of policies or mobility of support. The input process in determining the P-APBD of Samosir Regency began with political lobbying, revenue collection, or even meetings before the PDIP faction's plenary meeting at the Samosir Regency's local government. In addition, this was also based on the internal conflict between the local government and the PDI-P faction of Samosir Regency and the PDI-P faction's dissatisfaction with the election results. Therefore, the rejection of the PDIP faction's request for consideration of the P-APBD ended with the local government of Simosir district continuing the two Honorarium policies and the hotel rental policy as part of the contents of the P-APBD discussion, which ultimately caused rejection from the PDI-P faction and chose to walk out as an act of using veto rights and not attending the plenary meeting.

Political Process in the Determination of P-APBD of Samosir Regency for Fiscal Year 2022

Samosir Regency is one of the regions that amended the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (P-APBD) for Fiscal Year 2022. This change was made because some budgets were not on target. In the Determination of Amendments to the Regional Budget (P-APBD) of Samosir Regency, there was a phenomenon where the APBD Amendment was not carried out or was not parliamentary

due to a lack of communication between the Samosir Regency Regional Government as the executive and the Samosir Regency DPRD Members as the legislature. This happened because of the absence of the PDIP faction in the plenary meeting.

The political process of the emergence of the phenomenon of the failure of the Samosir Regency P-APBD plenary began with the Budget Agency Meeting in the context of Finalising and Preparing the Discussion Report on the Draft KUA and Draft PPAS P-APBD. The meeting aimed to discuss and adjust the draft KUA and PPAS based on the input received. The main objective is to reach an agreement and ensure that the budget plan reflects the parties' needs, aspirations, and priorities. According to David Easton's political system theory, the input process is the stage at which the political system gathers information and aspirations from the community. This input is then converted and processed by political actors in the conversion stage before being produced into outputs, namely government policies or actions. Thus, the preparation meeting of the discussion report on the draft KUA and PPAS is part of the input process in the political system, which aims to gather input and influence the conversion and output stages in budget policymaking.

The main factor that caused the failure of the Samosir Regency P-APBD ratification was the absence of one faction and several members from other factions during the plenary meeting, which did not fulfill the quorum, where the quorum for a local regulation ratification meeting is a minimum of 17 out of 25 people according to the Samosir Regency DPRD Standing Orders. It should be noted that the current number of Samosir Regency DPRD members is 25 people, and the PDI-P faction occupies 8 seats. 8 DPRD members from the PDI-P faction decided not to attend the plenary session to approve the P-APBD of Samosir Regency, followed by 1 person from the Golkar faction and 1 person from the NasDem faction. Through this case, the PDI-P, Golkar, and NasDem factions became political actors *with* the potential to veto players, especially the PDI-P faction. As stated by Nasip Simbolon, the second vice chairman of the Samosir Regency DPRD,

"The failure to approve the P-APBD was because there was one faction out of four that refused to approve the P-APBD."

The PDI-P faction has significant power to influence the outcome of the Samosir Regency P-APBD ratification because the PDI-P faction is the dominant faction in the Samosir Regency. The absence of the PDI-P faction and several members from other factions during the plenary meeting led to the non-fulfillment of the plenary quorum, which is the minimum number of members that must be present to pass local regulations. In this case, the quorum for the Samosir Regency P-APBD ratification meeting was a minimum of 17 out of a total of 25 members of the Samosir Regency DPRD. With the

absence of 8 DPRD members from the PDI-P faction, 1 member from the Golkar faction, and 1 member from the NasDem faction, the quorum was not fulfilled, so the ratification of the Samosir Regency P-APBD for the 2022 fiscal year failed. It can be concluded that the members of these factions have used their veto rights by not attending the meeting.

In this context, the PDI-P faction has 8 members, all of whom did not attend the meeting. This faction can potentially be a veto player because, in their absence, decisions or policy changes that require approval from the PDI-P faction can be hampered. The existence of this veto player can affect the stability of policies, especially if the decision requires the approval of the majority of DPRD members. On the other hand, several members from other factions, such as PKB, NasDem, Golkar, Gerindra, Demokrat, and Hanura, attended the meeting. In veto player theory, these members do not have the potential to be veto players because their numbers need to reach the threshold needed to influence decisions. Therefore, decisions that require majority approval can be made despite the absence of the PDI-P faction. However, it is essential to note that this analysis assumes that all faction members have the same preferences and will act by the faction's decision. If there are differences in preferences within factions, this may also affect the stability of policies and meeting outcomes. Overall, the attendance of Samosir Regency DPRD members at the P-APBD plenary meeting indicates the potential influence of veto players from the PDI-P faction who did not attend. However, to ascertain the impact on policy stability, it is necessary to consider the political dynamics within the faction and the presence of other political actors who can influence the decision-making process.

By the Rules of Procedure of the Samosir Regency DPRD CHAPTER XII Part Three on Decision Making Article 106 paragraph (1), part b reads "attended by at least 2/3 (two thirds) of the total number of DPRD Members to dismiss DPRD Leaders and to determine regional regulations and APBD. It can be concluded that the Samosir Regency DPRD plenary meeting cannot continue because it does not fulfill the quorum and has used all the suspension quota. "Suspension" is a term used to denote a temporary pause or suspension during a meeting. A suspension can be called by the meeting chairperson or agreed upon by most DPRD members present. Suspensions are generally imposed when chaos or time is needed to sort things out before the meeting can resume. Since the discussion of the R-APBD in 2022, the PDI-P faction has refused and decided to walk out during the voting process to establish the Samosir APBD Regional Regulation in 2022. Several policies made the PDI-P faction choose to walk out; the first is the issue of the honorarium policy for the Regent Team for the Acceleration of Development, which costs a considerable amount of Rp.17,000,000 per person. A direct statement from a DPRD member of the PDI-P faction, Maringan Naibaho, supported this:

"The PDI-P faction rejects the ratification of the 2022 P-APBD because of the Samosir Regency Government's policy that is not in accordance with the laws and regulations regarding the honorarium of the Regent's Team for Accelerated Development, yes that is in accordance with the PDI-P faction's statement, meaning that PDI-P is present as an opposition to the Samosir Regency Regional Government".

The PDI-P faction considers this policy to be more inclined to reciprocal politics, and this has become a finding of BPK RI in the audit of the Samosir Regency Government's financial statements. The Regent's Team for the Acceleration of Development is a team formed by the Regent or regional head to accelerate and speed up the development process in the region. This team usually consists of several officials or representatives from various government agencies at the local and regional levels. It may also involve the private sector, the community, or other relevant groups. The primary function of the Bupati Team is to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the implementation of ongoing development programs and projects in the area. They are responsible for ensuring development projects run according to the prescribed schedule and achieve the set objectives.

In this case, the PDI-P faction was one of the political actors who provided input in discussing the honorarium policy for the Regent Team for the Acceleration of Development. The PDI-P faction provides input based on their assessment that this policy is more likely to be a politics of reciprocity, where the policy is based on the exchange of political support or personal relationships. Output in the political system refers to decisions or policies resulting from the political process. In this case, the expected output is the readjustment of the policy on the honorarium of the Regent Team for the Acceleration of Development. The PDI-P faction chose to walk out as a form of protest or rejection of the policy so that the decision or output that the Regional Government had designed was not ratified, as Nasip Simbolon said.

"The urgency of PDI-P is because they are the faction that carries the incumbent candidate and lost the election, but as an opposition party it is natural for them to criticise the policies of the Samosir district government in order to ratify the P-APBD because it is natural that they must reject when they consider that the policy is not pro-people, but on the one hand the rules related to TBPP already exist, but in political terms wherever the opposition must criticise."

In Tsebeis' veto player theory (2011), political actors such as the PDI-P faction have a role in changing existing policies (policy-seeking actors). The PDI-P faction views the honorarium policy of the Regent Team for the Acceleration of Development as a controversial policy, not by their preferences or interests. The PDI-P faction has veto power that they can use to obstruct or change the policy. In this case, they chose to walk out as a form of protest or rejection of the policy. The PDI-P faction sees the honorarium policy of the Regent Team for the Acceleration of Development as a policy

that is more inclined to reciprocity politics, which is based on the exchange of political support or personal relationships, not on objective considerations or public interests.

Furthermore, what became a polemic for the PDI-P faction was the existence of a lease budget of Rp. 40,000,000 per month to rent a part of the Vantas Hotel room, which was used as the Regent's official residence/residence of the Samosir Regent. This statement was quoted in an interview with the 2nd Vice Chairman of the Samosir Regency DPRD, Nasip Simbolon.

"well then also what makes the PDI-P faction refuse to attend because according to them there is a policy of renting a hotel as an official residence that costs quite a lot, they strengthen their argument because the hotel belongs to the regent's father so they think something is not right here, I need to emphasize once again that in the P-APBD Samosir Regency Fiscal Year 2022 there is no budget to rent a hotel as an official residence, the issue is only the honorarium of TBPP."

When members of the PDI-P faction held hearings with the press, community leaders, and the public outside of the budget policy, the PDI-P faction also conveyed to the Samosir Regent that the Regent's parents, namely Ober Gultom, should not interfere too much in the affairs of the Samosir Regency Government. In the process of discussing the 2022 P-APBD, the PDI-P faction submitted a request to the Samosir Regent to dissolve the Regent Team for the Acceleration of Development, remove the hotel rental budget for the Regent's residence, and propose that the Regent immediately occupy a permanently renovated official residence, by the recommendations of the Indonesian Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) in the audit of the financial statements of the Samosir Regency Government in 2022.

DPRD meetings are an essential mechanism for public participation in the political process. By David Easton's political system theory, DPRD meetings can be categorized as one form of input in the political system. These meetings allow The public to provide input, opinions, or complaints regarding the discussed policy issues. In addition, factions and DPRD members also act as the main actors who provide meeting input. They represent the voices and interests of their communities and use the meetings as a platform to deliver input, suggestions, or policy proposals. The agenda for discussion in DPRD meetings is also an essential part of the input, as it reflects input from various parties who want to include specific issues in policy discussions. Thus, DPRD meetings can be categorized as a form of input in David Easton's political system theory that provides space for the participation and influence of political actors in the political decision-making process.

In Tsebelis' (2011)veto player theory, policy stability tends to be high when there are many veto players or when veto players have significant ideological differences. In this case, although the

PDI-P faction has the potential to be a veto player, the number of veto players from other factions is limited. Therefore, the impact of these veto players on policy stability may be more limited than if there were more political actors with veto power. However, it is essential to remember that this analysis is based on attendance data in one particular meeting. The role of veto players and policy stability is also influenced by other political factors outside meetings, such as internal faction dynamics and interactions with other political actors. Therefore, conducting a more comprehensive analysis is necessary to fully understand the influence of the veto player in the policy context at the Samosir Regency DPRD. Overall, the incomplete attendance of PDI-P faction members at the P-APBD plenary meeting may indicate the existence of a potential veto player in the decision-making process related to APBD amendments. However, the impact of this veto player on policy stability and the likelihood of policy change needs to be analyzed more deeply by considering factors and dynamics inside and outside the meeting.

CONCLUSION

The main factor that caused the failure of the Samosir Regency P-APBD ratification was the absence of one faction and several members from other factions at the plenary meeting, so it did not meet the quorum, where the quorum for a local regulation ratification meeting is at least 17 out of 25 people according to the Samosir Regency DPRD Standing Orders. By the Samosir Regency DPRD Rules of Procedure, CHAPTER XII Part Three on Decision Making Article 106 paragraph (1) part b reads "attended by at least 2/3 (two thirds) of the total number of DPRD Members to dismiss DPRD Leaders and to determine regional regulations and APBD. The faction in question is the PDI-P faction, which occupies 8 seats. The eight members of the DPRD were absent at the plenary session to approve the P-APBD of Samosir Regency, followed by 1 person from the Golkar faction and 1 person from the NasDem faction. It can be concluded that out of 25 Samosir DPRD members, only 15 were present, and 10 were absent.

Several policies made the PDI-P faction choose to walk out, the first of which was the issue of the honorarium policy for the Regent's Team for the Acceleration of Development, which cost a considerable amount of Rp.17,000,000 per person. The PDI-P faction considers this policy to be more inclined to reciprocal politics, and this has become a finding of BPK RI in the audit of the Samosir Regency Government's financial statements. Furthermore, a polemic for the PDI-P faction is a monthly lease budget of Forty million to rent a part of the Vantas Hotel room, which is used as the regent's official residence/residence of the Samosir Regent. It should also be noted that the Vantas Hotel belongs to the parents of the Samosir Regent, namely Ober Gultom. In this case, the PDI-P faction has

used their veto rights as the dominant faction in the Samosir Regency, where they chose not to attend the plenary session so that the policies discussed and designed are not passed. In David Easton's political system theory, this is the output of policies drafted by the local government.

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